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By: Gregory W. Watts & Matthew W. Onest1 
 
I. MINERAL OWNERSHIP 
 
This section will discuss judicial decisions which seek to aid 
the determination of mineral rights ownership.  
 
A. The Ohio Marketable Title Act 
 
In recent years, as a result of Ohio’s Utica shale boom, Ohio 
courts have confronted the issue of how to apply the Ohio Marketable 
Title Act.2 As with many statutes, there are generally two questions to 
answer: (1) does the particular statute apply to the particular facts of 
the case? and (2) if the statute applies in the first instance, how does a 




 1. Attorneys at the law firm of Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., 
L.P.A. 
 2. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47–5301.56 (West 2019). 
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questions about Ohio’s Marketable Title Act and severed mineral 
interests were examined and explored in 2019. 
The Seventh District Court of Appeals, which appears to have 
examined the most cases involving questions of severed mineral 
ownership, recently answered the first question in the affirmative, 
holding the Ohio Marketable Title Act applies to severed mineral 
interests. In Stalder v. Bucher, the severed mineral owners claimed the 
Ohio Marketable Title Act does not apply to severed mineral interests, 
meaning it would not extinguish severed mineral interests because the 
Ohio Dormant Mineral Act exists to abandon severed minerals, i.e. 
they argued the specific statute (“Dormant Mineral Act”) controls over 
the general statute (the “Marketable Title Act”).3 The Seventh District 
rejected this argument and held both statutes are equally and 
separately applicable to severed mineral interests.4 
As to the applicability of the Ohio Marketable Title Act to 
specific facts, the Seventh District Court of Appeals issued several 
decisions in close proximity to one another and which appear to be 
internally inconsistent on how to apply the statute to severed property 
interests.  
In order to prevail on a claim that the Marketable Title Act 
extinguished certain property interests, one must show the interest to 
be extinguished predates the “root of title” for the particular property 
interest.5 The “root of title” is defined as the “conveyance or other title 
transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create the 
interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the 
marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded 
as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being 
determined.”6 
Another section of the Ohio Marketable Title heavily litigated 
in 2019 and involving the “root of title” is Revised Code § 5301.49(A), 
which provides property interests are preserved, i.e. protected from 
extinguishment, if they are specifically referenced within the 
muniments of title. In late 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a 
 
 3. Stalder v. Bucher, No. 17 MO 0017, slip op. ¶¶ 11–19 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
3, 2019), appeal denied, 125 N.E.3d 937 (Ohio 2019). 
 4. Id. at ¶ 19 (“Because an oil and gas interest is subject to both the MTA and 
the DMA, the trial court did not err in finding the MTA applicable in this case.”). 
 5. § 5301.50. 
 6. § 5301.47. 
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three-part test for determining whether an interest was specifically 
referenced under Revised Code § 5301.49(A).7 
In early 2019, in three separate decisions, the Seventh District 
held that any reference to a severed mineral interest with a purported 
root of title, including general reservation language such as “reserving 
all oil and gas,” prevented a party from claiming marketable title as 
against any severed mineral interests predating that root of title.8 
However, the Seventh District appears to have implicitly overruled 
itself in Stalder.9 
Additionally, in Hickman, the Seventh District granted 
appellants’ application for reconsideration and enacted a new rule for 
this reference-within-root issue—the void within chain-of-title rule. 
On September 25, 2019, the Hickman court reconsidered its previous 
opinion and offered a new justification for that decision.10 It held that 
a court need not apply the Blackstone test to a purported repetition or 
reference within a root of title unless the record, meaning the 
evidentiary record before the court, contains all title documents within 
the chain-of-title from the date of severance forward.11 The opinion 
goes further by essentially holding that the Marketable Title Act would 
not extinguish an interest absent those title documents being presented 
at evidence in a lawsuit seeking confirmation of extinguishment under 
the statute.12 This appears to be an implicit, and possibly mistaken, 
holding that the statute operates once a lawsuit is filed.13 
In a non-mineral rights case, the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals in David v. Paulsen further discussed how one determined the 
 
 7. Blackstone v. Moore, 122 N.E.3d 132, 136 (Ohio 2018) (“The statute 
presents a three-step inquiry: (1) Is there an interest described within the chain of 
title? (2) If so, is the reference to that interest a ‘general reference’? (3) If the answers 
to the first two questions are yes, does the general reference contain a specific 
identification of a recorded title transaction? Here, the answer to the first question is 
yes: the 1969 deed that constitutes the root of title recites that it is subject to the 
royalty interest. Thus, we turn to the second question: is the reference a ‘general 
reference’?”) 
 8. Hickman v. Consolidation Coal Co., 129 N.E.3d 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019); 
Miller v. Mellott, 130 N.E.3d 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019); Soucik v. Gulfport Energy 
Corp., No. 17 BE 0022, 2019 WL 549770, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019). 
 9. But see Hickman v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 17 CO 0012, 2019 WL 
4894087 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2019). 
 10. Hickman, 2019 WL 4894087. 
 11. Id. ¶ 24. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Warner v. Palmer, No. 14 BE 0038, 2017 WL 1102786, slip op. ¶ 34, 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2017). 
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specific “root of title.”14 As previously discussed, the “root of title” is 
determined based, in part, on the following criteria: “which was the 
most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time 
when marketability is being determined . . . .” The David court 
analyzed what is meant by “the time when marketability is being 
determined. In doing so, the court held that the date marketability is 
determined is the date on which the superiority of the property rights 
at issue is being asserted.15 
However, the Seventh District determined that the forty-year 
period for severed mineral interests is essentially a rolling period, 
governed by the potential root of title documents.16 
On June 19, 2019, the Seventh District Court of Appeals 
decided Kilburn v. Graham.17 Kilburn involved the interpretation of 
the following mineral conveyance language—”the one-half part or 
share of their royalty of all [the oil] and gas in and under [the 
property].”18 In 1919, Frieda and Chancy Ankrom owned the surface 
estate and one-half of the oil and gas royalty for 120 acres in Monroe 
County, Ohio. In May of 1919, the Ankroms conveyed “unto F .F 
Burkhart, A.C. and E.L. Peters and H.J. Cooper the one-half part or 
share of their royalty of all [the oil] and gas in and under [the 
property].”19 The dispute involved the present surface owner of the 
property (the plaintiff) and the heirs of F.F. Burkhart.20 
 The trial court found the use of the term “the one-half” in the 
Ankrom conveyance meant they conveyed the entirety of their interest 
and that the conveyance consisted of three equal, undivided parts, 
meaning a total of one-sixth interest in the royalties was conveyed to 
F.F. Burkhart, A.C. and E.L. Peters, and H.J. Cooper.21 
 
 14. David v. Paulsen,—N.E.3d—, 2019 WL 2323846, ¶¶ 15–24 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2019). 
 15. Id. at ¶ 20 (“We think it more appropriate to determine marketability as of 
the date that David and Sanders sought to enforce a purportedly-superior right to the 
property-which, in this case, was the date that they filed an action to enforce the 
Declaration of Restrictions against the Moores.”). 
 16. Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, No. 18 BE 0051, 2019 WL 5544130, slip op. ¶¶ 
53–58 (Ohio Ct. App. October 11, 2019). 
 17. No. 18 MO 0022, 2019 WL 2755129, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 19,2019). 
 18. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 19. Id. ¶ 3. 
 20. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7.  
 21. Id. at ¶ 13. 
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 The Seventh District upheld the trial court on both points. As 
to the interpretation of “the one-half part or share of their royalty,” the 
Seventh District provided little to no analysis to support its conclusion: 
 
At the time of the conveyance, the Ankroms owned an 
undivided 1/2 interest in the oil and gas royalty. The 
fact that the conveyance granted “the one-half part or 
share of their royalty” indicates that the Ankroms 
intended to convey their entire interest in the royalty. 
“[T]heir share,” indicates that the Ankroms only owned 
a portion of the royalty, not the whole royalty. As they 
conveyed “the one-half part or share,” the deed shows 
that the Ankroms intended to convey their entire 
interest in the royalty.22 
 
Based on the scant amount of legal analysis, it is difficult to 
believe the holding of this case will offer much precedential value to 
other deed interpretation cases. However, if one is confronted with 
interpreting a conveyance involving fractional interests, this case may 
help provide a little guidance as to how to interpret said conveyance. 
 As to the number of shares conveyed by the Ankroms, the 
Seventh District held that the Ankroms conveyed three equal shares. 
The Seventh District relied, principally, upon the lack of a serial or 
Oxford comma between A.C. and E.L. Peters name.23 The appellate 
court refrained from rewriting the deed to state either “F .F Burkhart, 
A.C., and E.L. Peters, and H.J. Cooper” or “F .F Burkhart, A.C. Peters, 
and E.L. Peters and H.J. Cooper.”24 The court further relied upon the 
fact that the grantees were grouped by last names, indicating three 
distinct groups of grantees.25 
In Windland v. Christman, the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals analyzed how res judicata, which is comprised of claim and 
issue preclusion, may work when a surface owner sues a severed 
mineral interest owner’s predecessors and a judgment has been 
rendered against those prior mineral owners.26 In Winland, the 
 
 22. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 23. Id. at ¶ 30. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at ¶ 31.  
 26. Winland v. Christman, No. 18 MO 0005, 2019 WL 2513801, slip op. (Ohio 
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putative mineral owners alleged to have acquired the severed mineral 
interest via inheritance from their father.27 Their father had acquired 
the interest in 1944 via an auditor’s deed.28 That deed made specific 
reference to two of the original owners (Bentley and Watson).29 In a 
previous lawsuit, the surface owner sued Bentley and Watson and 
“their unknown heirs, devisees and legatees.”30 The surface owner 
ultimately prevailed in that lawsuit, and the court of common pleas 
determined he owned the severed mineral rights.31 Even though the 
putative mineral owners in Winland were not named in the previous 
lawsuit, the Seventh District still held they were bound by that 
decision. Thus, their claim of mineral ownership was barred based 
upon res judicata because they were in privity with the original mineral 
owners (Bentley and Watson).32 
 
B. The Ohio Dormant Mineral Act 
 
In Gerrity v. Chervenak, T. D. Farwell originally reserved oil 
and gas rights underlying a Guernsey County property in a 1961 
deed.33 Mr. Farwell’s estate conveyed the reserved mineral rights to 
his daughter, Jane F. Richards, via a recorded certificate of transfer in 
1965.34 The certificate of transfer listed Ms. Richards as living at a 
Cleveland, Ohio address.35 The reserved interest was not thereafter 
conveyed of record in Guernsey County.36 
In 1999, the Chervenaks acquired the surface of the lands.37 In 
2012, the Chervenaks initiated abandonment procedures under the 
Dormant Mineral Act, sending notice of abandonment to Ms. Richards 
at the Cleveland address listed on the 1965 certificate of transfer via 
certified mail.38 When certified mail failed, the Chervenaks served 
 
Ct. App. June 14, 2019) appeal denied. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 52. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. ¶ 46. 
 31. Id. ¶ 43. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 52–55. 
 33. Gerrity v. Chervenak, No. 18 CA 26, 2019 WL 2745501, slip op. ¶ 2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 28, 2019) appeal docketed. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. ¶ 15. 
 36. See Id. 
 37. Id. ¶ 3. 
 38. Id. 
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notice of abandonment via publication in a Guernsey County 
newspaper and then completed the abandonment process by filing a 
notice of failure to file.39 
Timothy Gerrity, a resident of Franklin County, Ohio, and the 
sole heir of Jane F. Richards, claimed to be the rightful owner of the 
mineral interest.40 Mr. Gerrity sued the Chervenak Family Trust, the 
then-owner of the surface estate, claiming that the abandonment 
procedures were invalid due to the Chervenaks’ failure to exercise 
reasonable diligence to locate him and serve him notice.41 The trial 
court found in favor of the Chervenak Family Trust.42  
The Fifth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s 
decision in its entirety, determining that the Chervenaks’ attempts to 
locate the heirs of Ms. Richards were reasonable.43 The Fifth District 
noted Ms. Richards’ address as being in Cleveland, Ohio as of 1965, 
and while she died in Broward County, Florida in 1997, there was 
nothing of record in Guernsey County or Cuyahoga County to point 
the Chervenaks to Florida.44 After certified mail to the Cleveland 
address failed, the Chervenaks searched the recorder’s and probate 
records in Guernsey County, Ohio (location of property) and 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio (last known address for Ms. Richards) and 
found nothing to indicate any other location for Ms. Richards or her 
heirs.45 
The Fifth District held an exhaustive internet search for Ms. 
Richard’s heirs was not warranted for several reasons: (1) Gerrity was 
an attorney in Franklin County, Ohio, with a different last name than 
Ms. Richards, the registered holder of the interest; (2) the Chervenaks 
searched recorder and probate records in both the county in which the 
property was located and the county of Ms. Richards’ last known 
location; and (3) that search did not reveal any further addresses for 
Ms. Richards or her heirs.46 The Fifth District determined that the 
Dormant Mineral Act did not contemplate a “worldwide exhaustive 
 
 39. Id. ¶ 19. 
 40. Id. ¶ 3. 
 41. Id. ¶ 4. 
 42. Id. ¶ 5. 
 43. Id. ¶¶ 24–27. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶ 25. 
 46. Id. 
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search” for a holder, and on these facts, upheld the validity of the 
abandonment procedure.47 
 
II. MINERAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
 
This section will discuss judicial decisions, legislation, and 
administrative law changes relating to mineral development. 
 
A. Recording Statutes Apply to Assignments of ORRI 
 
In Talmage v. Bradley, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio had to decide, on summary judgment, 
whether Ohio’s recording statutes apply to assignments or other 
conveyances of overriding royalty interests in oil and gas leases. More 
specifically, whether an unrecorded assignment or conveyance of an 
overriding royalty interest may be enforced against a subsequent 
lessee (meaning one who acquired the subject lease after the creation 
of the override).48 
In April 1994, TransAtlantic Energy Corp., TransAtlantic 
Management Company, and TransAtlantic Gas Marketing, Inc. 
assigned various oil and gas leases.49 The TransAtlantic-Eastern 
assignment was recorded in Belmont, Monroe, and Noble Counties in 
Ohio.50 All of the leases assigned were described in one exhibit, 
meaning they were conveyed by one instrument.51 
After the Transatlantic assignment, the assignment of the 
overriding royalty at issue, made to Ralph Bradley, was recorded in 
Monroe County and Belmont County.52 Due to a clerical error, the 
assignment was not recorded in Noble County, despite it covering 
leases for Noble County properties.53  
Eastern States, which acquired the leases from TransAtlantic 
and conveyed the override to Mr. Bradley, underwent a series of 
mergers, name changes, and intercompany transfers.54 NCL 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. 377 F. Supp. 3d 799, 808 (S.D. Ohio 2019). 
 49. Id. at 803. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 804–05. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 805. 
  
292 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
Appalachian Partners, LP eventually acquired Eastern’s interest in the 
leases and wells.55 NCL thereafter assigned the leases and wells to 
Northwood Energy.56 The NCL-Northwood Assignment provided that 
Northwood acquired NCL’s interest in the leases, subject to all 
overriding royalty interests of record.57 
At the time Northwood Energy was acquiring NCL’s interest, 
Northwood was also acquiring a 50% interest in the undeveloped 
portions of the leases, which TransAtlantic had originally retained 
when the leases and wells were originally conveyed to Eastern.58 In 
2012, Northwood Energy sold the deep rights to the leases, and other 
unrelated leases, to Gulfport Energy Corporation.59 Gulfport 
subsequently sold some of the leases to Antero Resources 
Corporation.60 
In early 2010, Northwood Energy received a series of emails 
from Joseph W. Haas of Reserve Energy Exploration, which detailed 
the terms of the Bradley override and provided a copy of the override 
assignment.61 Northwood Energy had separately obtained due 
diligence information from another producer, which contained, in part, 
specific information relating to the Bradley override.62 Additionally, 
in August of 2012, Ralph Bradley detailed his override in a 
communication with Northwood Energy.63 
The primary questions before the court was whether Ohio’s 
recording statutes applied to assignments of overriding royalties and 
if so, which of the statutes applied to such assignments? 
By way of background, two Ohio recording statues were at 
issue in Talmage. The first, contained at Revised Code § 5301.09, 
specifically applies to oil and gas leases and interests related thereto.64 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 807. 
 61. Id. at 805–06. 
 62. Id. at 806. 
 63. Id. 
 64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.09 (West 2019) (“In recognition that such 
leases and licenses create an interest in real estate, all leases, licenses, and 
assignments thereof, or of any interest therein, given or made concerning lands or 
tenements in this state, by which any right is granted to operate or to sink or drill 
wells thereon for natural gas and petroleum or either, or pertaining thereto, shall be 
filed for record and recorded in such lease record without delay…”). 
  
2020] OHIO 293 
 
The second, contained at Revised Code § 5301.25, is Ohio’s general 
recording statute, governing all conveyances of land, encumbrances 
on land, tenements, or hereditaments.65 
Initially, it must be noted that the Talmage court did not choose 
one of the recording statutes. Instead, it analyzed the facts of the case 
under both statutes, ultimately determining it could not decide the 
applicability of the statutes on summary judgment. 
As to the applicability of Revised Code § 5301.09, the court 
decided it could not determine the applicability of one of the statute’s 
exceptions to recording—the exception that “the recording 
requirement is not applicable between the contracting parties.”66 
Section 5301.09 of the Revised Code states, in pertinent part: “No 
such lease or license is valid until it is filed for record, except as 
between the parties thereto, unless the person claiming thereunder is 
in actual and open possession.”67 The court’s analysis focused on the 
emphasized language. First, the court held the statute applies to 
assignments or conveyances of overriding royalty interests, meaning 
such documents must be recorded in order to avoid a subsequent lessee 
from seeking to avoid the unrecorded override.68 The court held it 
needed to determine whether Northwood could be “deemed as 
standing in the shoes of Eastern” because the Bradley override 
assignment was not recorded in Noble County (which was the county 
at issue in plaintiffs’ claims seeking to avoid the override). This would 
therefore mean the “as between the parties” exception within Revised 
Code § 5301.09 was met.69 After reviewing the various contracts and 
agreements, the court could not say the facts were undisputed on this 
issue and therefore refused to grant summary judgment to any party. 
As to the applicability of Revised Code § 5301.25, the court 
likewise passed on giving summary judgment to any party because 
there was a factual dispute as to whether Northwood Energy 
Corporation (the first lessee to acquire the leases from the original 
lessee group) had actual knowledge of the unrecording overriding 
royalty when it acquired the leases.70 The court examined numerous 
 
 65. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5301.25 (West 2019). 
 66. Talmage v. Bradley, 377 F. Supp. 3d 799, 810 (S.D. Ohio 2019).  
 67. Id. at 816 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 817. 
 69. Id. at 810. 
 70. Id. at 815 (“In conclusion, the Court cannot make a final decision as to 
whether Northwood was a bona fide purchaser as there is a question of fact as to 
  
294 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
pieces of evidence going to the issue of Northwood’s knowledge of 
the Bradley override prior to its acquisition of the leases and wells. 
One should review that case in detail to examine the various pieces of 
evidence which relate to a purchaser’s knowledge of an unrecorded 
overriding royalty.71 
 
B. Royalty Disputes 
 
The Zehentbauer Family Land, LP v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. 
case is a class action royalty dispute alleging claims that Chesapeake 
Exploration, LLC wrongfully made royalty deductions against the 
landowners’ lease royalties.72 On appeal was the issue of whether the 
district court had properly granted class certification.73 The specific 
issue on appeal relating to the class certification was whether the 
predominance requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) was met 
when “plaintiffs argue that the netback method breached the leases 
because the defendants improperly deducted post-production costs in 
violation of the lease language prohibiting the defendants from 
deducting any expenses other than the plaintiffs’ share of taxes.”74 
Since the leases presented uniform royalty provisions, the Sixth 
Circuit held that plaintiffs met their burden of showing predominance 
of issues amongst the class members: 
 
If the plaintiffs prevail in showing that the defendants’ 
uniform practice of deducting post-production costs to 
calculate royalties breached the leases, then the 
plaintiffs will have succeeded in proving liability. And 
conversely, if the defendants’ method of calculating 
royalty payments by deducting post-production costs 
did not breach the leases, then all of the plaintiffs’ 
claims will fail on the merits. This theory of liability, 
moreover, does not require an estimation of the 
 
what Northwood knew at the time the NCL-Northwood Assignment was made.”). 
 71. Id. at 812–14. 
 72. 935 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2019) (“According to the plaintiffs, the 
defendants underpaid the royalties due to the plaintiffs during the years in question 
because the netback method (1) does not accurately approximate an arm’s-length-
transaction price, and (2) improperly deducts post-production costs from the price.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 506. 
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individual market prices of oil and gas at each well. 
Liability will turn solely on whether the leases permit 
the defendants to deduct post-production costs in 
calculating the royalties due to the plaintiffs (like the 
at-the-well rule), or whether the leases prohibit the 
defendants from deducting post-production costs (like 
the marketable-product rule).75 
 
In upholding the class certification, the Sixth Circuit rejected 
defendants’ contention that the court should fully examine and 
determine the merits of the parties’ positions, i.e. whether the lessee 
was permitted to deduct post-production costs.76 The Sixth Circuit 
determined that a merits analysis was not necessary to determine 
whether there was a predominance of issues amongst the class 
members because the leases were identical.77 
The Sixth Circuit went further with the potential damage 
calculation plaintiffs could receive should they prevail on their theory 
of improper deductions, noting it relied on a rather straightforward 
calculation: 
 
Should the plaintiffs prevail in establishing that the 
defendants breached the leases by deducting post-
production costs, then the plaintiffs’ damages model 
must calculate what the royalty payments would have 
been had the defendants not deducted these costs in the 
royalty-payment calculations. This method will, in 
effect, base royalty payments solely on the prices at 
which the defendants’ midstream affiliates sold oil and 
gas to downstream companies. Damages will then 
equal the difference between the royalty payments 
based on the downstream prices and the actual royalty 
payments calculated using the netback method, the 
latter having deducted post-production costs. This 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 508. 
 77. Id. (“The defendants’ argument challenging the plaintiffs’ post-production-
costs theory is a merits argument that is not germane to the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), so we decline to engage with it at the present time.”). 
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damages model is consistent with the plaintiffs’ theory 
of liability.78 
 
C. Right to Inject Materials to Produce Oil and Gas 
 
In Merino v. Levine Oil Enterprises, LLC, the lessors brought 
a breach of contract claim against the lessee claiming a provision 
barring a lessee from injecting into the land prevented the lessee from 
injecting materials into the shale strata for purposes of facilitating 
hydraulic fracturing.79 The paragraph at issue stated the following: 
 
It is agreed upon that we will not travel through the 
land to transport gas unless a well is drilled first on the 
leased land. It is also agreed upon that we will not inject 
the land. A separate deal in the future is possible if 
injection for disposal of wells is needed. The lessee has 
the right to purchase the well at salvage value if lessor 
chooses to abandon it in the future.80 
 
On the other hand, the lessee claimed the paragraph relied upon by the 
lessors governed the use of disposal or injection wells and not 
production wells.81 Instead, lessee claimed paragraph 1 of the lease 
governed producing wells and that hydraulic fracturing, including 
through the use of injecting water and chemicals, was permitted under 
that paragraph.82 
Ultimately, the court of appeals sided with the lessee and held 
paragraph 1 governed the drilling of production wells and did not limit 
the lessee’s ability to stimulate a well through hydraulic fracturing.83 
Instead, the paragraph specifically permitted use of injection of water 
and chemicals to aid in a well’s production: 
 
That the Lessor * * * for the purpose of drilling, 
operation for, producing and the covenants and 
 
 78. Id. at 510. 
 79. Merino v. Levine Oil Enter., LLC, 131 N.E.3d 368, 371 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2019). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at  375. 
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agreements hereinafter contained, does hereby lease 
exclusively unto the Lessee, for the purpose of drilling, 
operation for, producing and removing oil and gas and 
all the constituents thereof, and of injecting air, gas, 
brine and other substances from any sources and into 
any subsurface strata.84 
 
D. Statutory Unitization and Breach of Lease 
 
On June 19, 2019, the Seventh District Court of Appeals issued 
a decision in Paczewski v. Antero Resources Corp., which involved an 
oil and gas lessee’s use of Ohio’s forced unitization procedure.85 The 
oil and gas lease in Paczewski, entered into in 1975, covered over 700 
acres of property in Monroe County, Ohio and originally stated that 
the lessee could consolidate the leased lands with other lands to form 
development units not to exceed a total of 640 acres.86 However, the 
original parties struck that clause by crossing out the text of the 
provision.87 Ultimately, it appeared that sixteen shallow wells were 
drilled on the 700-plus acres, including a shallow well on the 
plaintiffs’ property.88 
Antero Resources Corp. eventually acquired the deep rights for 
the lease.89 Antero attempted to negotiate an amendment to the lease, 
permitting Antero to pool or unitize the leased acreage with other 
acreage to form one or more units.90 Those efforts failed and as a 
result, Antero filed an application with the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources (“ODNR”) for a statutory unitization order under 
Revised Code § 1509.28.91 ODNR eventually approved the 
application and issued the unitization order including the leased 
 
 84. Id. at 371 (emphasis added). 
 85. Paczewski v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 18 MO 0016, 2019 WL 2722600, slip 
op. ¶ 2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). (“Appellants concede that the unitization order issued 
by the Division pursuant to R.C. 1509.28 (“Order”) is valid, but argue nonetheless 
that the Order constitutes a breach of the oil and gas lease at issue in this case, as 
well as an unconstitutional taking of the property and minerals subject to the lease 
without just compensation.”). 
 86. Id. ¶ 8. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. ¶ 9 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 10. 
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acreage.92 Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the Ohio Oil & Gas 
Commission and while that appeal was pending, they filed a lawsuit 
against Antero and the lessee owning the shallow rights.93 Two of 
plaintiffs’ claims were addressed by the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals’ opinion—breach of lease based on the statutory unitization, 
meaning a breach of contract claim, and a claim that the unitization 
order violated the Ohio Constitution’s takings clause. 
The trial court dismissed all claims within the plaintiffs’ 
complaint.94 After that decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
issued a decision in Am. Energy-Utica, LLC v. Fuller, holding that a 
lessee’s use of statutory unitization to unitize an oil and gas lease, 
which stated “UNITIZATION BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
ONLY!” constituted a breach of contract.95 Relying upon the Fuller 
decision, plaintiffs asked the trial court to vacate its dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.96 The trial court denied the request and the 
plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals.97 
Ultimately, the Seventh District Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court’s decision, thereby upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, in its entirety. As to the breach of contract issue, the 
Seventh District held that the lease at issue was silent as to whether 
Antero could unitize or pool the plaintiffs’ lands because the original 
unitization/pooling provision was stricken.98 The Seventh District 
adopted a rule, which was also adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh 
Appellate Courts, that provides a deleted or stricken lease clause 
renders the lease silent as to the subject matter of the stricken clause.99 
Thus, a stricken prohibition would mean the lease does not permit nor 
prohibit pooling.100 The Seventh District relied on this rule to uphold 
the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim: 
 
 
 92. Id. ¶ 13. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
 94. Id. ¶ 17. 
 95. American Energy-Utica, LLC. v. Fuller, No. 17 CA 000028, 2018 WL 
3868119, ¶ 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018). 
 96. Paczewski, 2019 WL 2722600, ¶ 21. 
 97. Id. ¶ 23. 
 98. Id. ¶ 34. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Having considered the arguments of all parties, we find 
that the deletion of the voluntary unitization clause in 
the Lease renders it silent on the issue of unitization in 
any form. Because the Lease is silent with respect to 
either type of unitization, we conclude that the Order 
does not constitute a breach of the Lease, and that 
Appellants’ first and second assignment of error have 
no merit.101  
 
Further, the Seventh District relied on the plaintiffs’ lease provision 
being stricken to distinguish the case from Fuller.102 
The Seventh District also upheld the trial court’s dismissal of 
the plaintiffs’ takings claim. The court relied on the fact that Ohio 
provides less protections to subsurface mineral rights, and the Ohio 
Supreme Court previously held the pooling procedures constitute a 
proper exercise of the state’s police power.103 Furthermore, the 
appellate court held, per the unitization statute, no unitization order 
may be construed to have caused the title of the minerals to be 
transferred.104 As a result, the court reasoned that Antero’s unitization 
order left the plaintiffs’ mineral interest intact, and the order was a 
mere regulation of mineral interests, not a taking without just 
compensation.105 
 
E. Paying Quantities and Conversion Post-Expiration 
 
In Woods v. Big Sky Energy, the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
rejected a producer’s argument that its challenging the ODNRs refusal 
to accept a bond (required under Ohio law to operate an oil and gas 
well) from the producer’s chosen insurance company.106 After it 
rejected the producer’s bond, the ODNR ordered the producer to cease 
producing all of its wells until a substitute bond was in place.107 
Instead of securing an alternate bond, which it admits it could have 
 
 101. Id. ¶ 35. 
 102. Id. ¶ 33. 
 103. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 104. Id. ¶ 44. 
 105. Id. ¶ 45. 
 106. Woods v. Big Sky Energy, No. CT2017-0031, 2019 WL 645151 slip op. ¶ 6 
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019). 
 107. Id. 
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done, the producer “refused to do so as a matter of principle because 
Barr [the producer] disagreed with ODNR’s decision.”108 Litigation 
between the producer and ODNR ensued and was still pending when 
Woods v. Big Sky Energy, which involved a paying quantities 
challenge by the lessor, went to trial.109 
The trial court held the lease had expired and that the producer 
had converted the lessor’s royalties and awarded the lessor $28,066.39 
in compensatory damages.110 The trial court issued a separate punitive 
damages award in the amount of $28,066.39, relying on the producer’s 
concealment of “records which would demonstrate their failure to pay 
the full amount of royalties due” to lessor.111 
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision that the 
lease had terminated and was not held under the lease’s force majeure 
clause. The court relied on the fact the producer admitted it could have 
obtained alternate insurance, which would have permitted it to 
produce its wells, but chose to fight the State of Ohio “as a matter of 
principle, to demonstrate he was right and ODNR was wrong.”112 
Ultimately, this decision means a producer that elects to not remedy 
the situation which led to a cease-production order from the ODNR 
while it is challenging the order does so at its own peril. 
The producer did prevail on its appeal of the conversion claim 
and was given another opportunity to challenge the amount of the 
conversion damages. Here, the appellate court held the lessor was 
entitled to the converted unpaid royalties and not the revenue from the 
well.113 Since the trial court gave a damages award based on the total 
revenue of the well and not the amount of royalties that would have 
been paid on that revenue under the terms of the lease, the appellate 
court found fault with the trial court’s calculation and remanded the 
matter for further proceedings.114 That trial would involve calculating 
the amount of “the converted royalties only.”115 
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